Ignorantia juris non excusat.   Ignorance of the law is no excuse!   It is a well settled principle of law that we, as citizens of a nation controlled by the rule of law, are responsible to know that law.   A bank robber cannot defend himself by saying he didn't know it was illegal to rob a bank.   That one is fairly obvious but it hardly describes the whole universe of law.   Laws are voluminous, complicated and change constantly.   This year there will be so many new pages of laws generated within these United States that it will be impossible for you to read them all, even if you devoted your life exclusively to the pursuit.   Theoretically we have underpinnings to our laws which enable you to understand the basics even if you cannot be expected to grasp any of the subtleties.   But that's really not particularly true any more as the Supreme Court's decision yesterday in Georgia v. Randolph ("Randolph") should make eminently clear.

Americans have a fundamental right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, particularly in their own home.   That right is expressed by the Fourth Amendment which provides "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

So police cannot enter your home to search without a valid, court issued, search warrant for which they had to show probable cause that you committed a crime.   That's pretty straightforward, right?   Not really.   There are, of course, nuances.

In its Randolph decision the Supreme Court reminded us that it "has held that the Fourth Amendment recognizes a valid warrantless entry and search of premises when police obtain the voluntary consent of an occupant who shares, or is reasonably believed to share, authority over the area in common with a co-occupant who later objects to the use of evidence so obtained."   The exception for consent extends even to entries and searches with the permission of a co-occupant whom the police reasonably, but erroneously, believe to possess shared authority as an occupant.   (see Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U. S. 177 (1990))

The Court also reminded us that who has authority to grant permission for entry to the police have nothing to do with property ownership.   Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 provided that the right of consent stems from an understanding of ordinary mutual use of property by persons generally having joint access.   "It is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit inspection in his own right and that others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched."   There are certain specialized tenancy arrangements "apparent to police."   For example, a landlord cannot consent to search of a tenant's house. (see Chapman v. United States, 365 U. S. 610 (1961))   Similarly, hotel staff may have access to a room for the purpose of cleaning it but have no authority to admit police.   Additionally, there are circumstances in which an occupant can permit entry but has no apparent authority to allow police to search.   For example, a child may permit an officer to enter the home but this does not confer authority to search other residents' rooms because "no one would reasonably expect such a child to be in a position to authorize anyone to rummage through his parents' bedroom."

The Randolph decision cited United States v. Matlock, 415 U. S. 164 (1974), ("Matlock"), saying, "Matlock's explanation for constitutional sufficiency of a co-tenant's consent to enter and search recognized a co-inhabitant's 'right to permit the inspection in his own right.' 415 U. S. at 171, n. 7, The right to admit the police is not a right as understood under property law.   It is, instead, the authority recognized by customary social usage as having substantial bearing on Fourth Amendment reasonableness in specific circumstances.   The question here is whether customary social understanding accords the consenting authority to prevail over co-tenant's objection, a question Matlock did not answer."   Also, Matlock and other precedent establish police may not simply place the objecting tenant in a squad car or fail to wake a present but sleeping tenant in order to avoid obtaining consent.   Matlock held that an individual who chooses to live with another assumes a risk no greater than "an inability to control access to the premises during [his] absence," and does not contemplate that his objection to a request to search commonly shared premises, if made, will be overlooked.

Adding to the complexity is Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U. S. 91 which provides, "overnight house guests have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their temporary quarters."   So, if you invite somebody over, they sit in your living room doing drugs, you call the cops and admit them into your home to put a stop to this, they cannot search your home over the objections of your houseguest!

Thus a disputed invitation by one tenant gives an officer no better claim to reasonableness in entering than he would have had absent any consent.   The police can always obtain a search warrant to search the home but that takes time.   However, the Court stated "The informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants as to what searches and seizures are permissible under the Constitution are to be preferred over the hurried actions of officers."

There were a number of descents to Randolph.   One suggested that this decision would prevent officers from entering a premise when an act of domestic violence was taking place because one co-tenant denied them entry.   The decision refuted this saying, "This case, which recognizes limits on evidentiary searches, has no bearing on the capacity of the police, at the invitation of one tenant, to enter a dwelling over another tenant's objection in order to protect a resident from domestic violence."   That is because there is a distinction between when police may enter without committing trespass, and when they may enter for purposes of searching for evidence.   No question reasonably could be raised about the authority of police to enter a dwelling in order to protect a resident from domestic violence provided that they have reason to believe a threat exists.   "(And since the police would then be lawfully in the premises, there is no question that they could seize any evidence in plain view or take further action supported by any consequent probable cause.)"

OK now, have you got it?   You are free from unreasonable search and seizure in your home - the police can enter to investigate, especially if they suspect domestic violence, but they have to have permission of all available tenants in order to gather valid evidence.   If one objects, they can't come in.   They cannot take one potentially objecting tenant and place him in the cruiser, then proceed to ask only the other tenant if they can come in.   If somebody is asleep, they have to wake him and ask for permission.   If your kid allows the police in, they can enter but they cannot search for evidence - they can obtain evidence if it is out in the open but they can't search.   And if you have a house guest, run out to get some victuals and your guest allows the police to come in and search, that's OK too.

Ignorantia juris non excusat.   Ignorance of the law is no excuse!   So, if you are not fully getting this tiny spec of one single principle of the mere underpinnings of our legal system, maybe you better quit your job and get busy educating yourself.   How much do we pay cops?   How much training do they get in the law?   What is the societal cost of having a legal system which is as clear as mud?